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Critics of Human Rights from a Historical Perspective1
Birden Güngören Bulgan
Abstract: Implementation of human rights is often criticized because 
it is perceived as being imposed on the rest of the world. In this 
case, human rights start to be seen as a sole abstraction, an emp-
ty word. What are the theoretical arguments of these critics and 
can we determine any historical grounds for them? In this paper, 
I will try to point at similar critics after the French Revolution – 
like that of the Historical School and Hegel – and try to show if 
some of these critics are still relevant. And I will compare these 
critics with contemporary arguments of cultural relativists. There 
are different streams and categorizations of human rights theories 
in today’s world. What differentiates them is basically the source 
of the human rights. After the French Revolution, the historical 
school had criticized the individuation and Hegel had criticized the 
formal freedom which was, according to him, a consequence of the 
Revolution. In this context Hegel drew a distinction between real 
freedom and formal freedom. Besides the theory of sources, the the-
ories of implementation such as human rights as a model of learn-
ing, human rights as a result of an historical process are worth 
attention. The crucial point is about integrating human rights as an 
inner process and not to use them as a tool for intervention in other 
countries, which we observe in today’s world. And this is the exact 
point why I find the discussion of the sources more important. This 
discussion can help us to show how the inner evaluation of a socie-
ty makes the realization of human rights possible and how we can 
avoid the above mentioned abstraction and misuse.
Keywords: Historical law school, Hegel, cultural relativism
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1. Natural Law Critic of the Historical Law School
The debate after the French revolution is important to under-
stand the source of the conflict. The French revolution which 
began like a spring with a vital energy, very fast turned 
into a chaotic period in which the leaders were killed and 
as time went by, freedoms and rights were forgotten. The 
influence to other countries is also very important. German 
intellectuals like Goethe, Hegel, Shelling, Fichte were at 
the beginning very enthusiastic. Hegel even described the 
French revolution as a magic sun rising. Also Napoléon was 
described by him like the ‘Weltgeist’ on his horse, when he 
arrived in Jena. But after the destructions, many of these 
enthusiastic intellectuals witnessed the time of terror and 
were much more sceptical.
When the revolution began, Burke’s “Reflexions on revo-
lution in France” was translated into German and defend-
ed by Rehberg, Fichte published his judgments of French 
Revolution as an answer to Rehberg. The revolution had 
its roots in the natural rights and the contractual theo-
ry. Burke thought that law was a result of the traditions 
and criticised the natural law and the contractual theo-
ry of Rousseau.2 So after the French Revolution there was 
a very large discussion about rights and freedoms and their 
sources. On the one hand there was the traditionalist cri-
tique, on the other hand, the utilitarians’ critique of the 
natural rights and furthermore also there was the histor-
icist critique. 3
2 August Wilhelm Rehberg, Recherches sur la révolution française, 
Vrin, Paris 1998, p. 64.
3 Binoche and Cléro use the consept ‘critique historiciste’ which 
include 1) the positivist critique; here we can find the critics of Ben-
jamin Constant and Auguste Comte; 2) the organic historicism which 
can be analysed in two parts: the linear historicism which is used by 
Savigny and the dialectical historicism of Hegel. See: Bertrand Bino-
che and Jean-Pierre Cléro, Bentham contre les droit de l’homme, Puf, 
Paris 2007, p. 186.
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The dispute between Thibaut4 and Savigny was basical-
ly about the codification after the Code Napoleon.5 Savigny’s 
book Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswis-
senschaft was an answer to Thibaut but it could also be read 
as the manifest of the historical law school. The term historic 
school appear first with N.T. Gönner in 1807, who is a college 
and adversary of Savigny.6 Savignys first article in Zeitschrift 
für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft (Journal of historical 
legal studies 1815) the base of this school and his fundamen-
tal notions appear.
Savigny, in a way, continued the organicism of Herder. 
In this movement against the rationality of the Enlight-
ment, notions like popular consciousness, organic devel-
opment and process of growth as a result of an inner 
process appear.7 We can see the principles of the histor-
ical school like the organic totality, historicism and par-
ticularism.8 The organic totality is a notion which comes 
from Schelling but was also used by Savigny and Puchta.9 
4 Thibaut’s work was his essay on the necessity of a code for Ger-
many: Über die Nothwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürgerlichen Rechts 
für Deutschland.
5 The main problem was whether the German people are ready 
for a new codification or not. Savigny wanted to protect the Roman 
law because he saw it as something which connected different peo-
ple and regions. Thibaut’s wish was to adopt a new code like the Code 
Napoléon which had its source in the German law and traditions. Sav-
igny wanted to show that the projects of codifications have their bas-
es in an abstraction of natural rights. The codification must show the 
spirit of the nation and also Hegel said that it is as absurd to give the 
English constitution to the Prussians as is absurd to give the Prussian 
constitution to the Turks. Hegel reminded that Napoléon wanted to give 
Spain a constitution and they rejected it because the constitution could 
be good but did not reflect the spirit of the Spanish people. See: Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie, Ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting, 
4. Band, Fromann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt 1974, p. 663.
6 Olivier Jouanjouan, Une Histoire de la pensée juridique en Alle-
magne (1800-1918), Puf, Paris 2005, p. 35.
7 Alfred Dufour, Droits de l’homme. Droit naturel et histoire, Puf, 
Paris 1991, p. 158.
8 Ibidem, p. 182.
9 The Hegelian Volksgeist-Theory has an influence on Savigny 
trough Puchtas mediation. See: S. Brie, Der Volksgeist bei Hegel und 
in der historischen Rechtsschule, Dr. Walther Rothschild, Berlin-Leip-
zig 1909, p. 1.
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It was a reaction against the atomism of the society and 
the individualism. The notions like historicism and the 
national particularism comes from Burke and Herder.10
The historical law school has a double orientation; one 
romanist-cosmopolitist and the other germanist national-
popular.11 Gustave Hugo was a Romanist and also criti-
cised the natural law in his book Lehrbuch des Naturrechts 
als positives Rechts. Savigny saw Roman Law as an exam-
ple of organic grown law.12 Savigny, Hugo, Puchta were the 
representatives of the romanist-universalist13 stream and 
Eichhorn, Jacob Grimm and Beseler were representatives 
of the the germanist national-popular stream.14 The german-
ist stream wanted to return to the German sources and that 
was the source of the debate between the two.15
Savigny criticised the concept of a universal natural 
right and described the natural law school as a “unhistor-
ical school”. The historical school saw law as something 
which depends on traditions and developed in the society. 
According to them, law was something which differs from 
nation to nation and in each society. But Savigny defend-
ed that history has continuity.16 For him the revolution-
ary rupture was totally an illusion.17 The historical law 
school is against the individualism of the French revolu-
tion18 and criticised the universal and abstract Principles 
10 Herder understands the nation as a natural organism and cul-
tural and historical totality. See: Heydar Reghaby, Revolutionäre und 
konservative Aspekte in der Philosophie des Volksgeistes, Inaugural-
Dissertation, Berlin 1963, p. 63.
11 A. Dufour, Droits de l’homme…, op. cit., p. 158.
12 Rainer Schröder, Rechtsgeschichte, Alpmann Schmidt, 2006, 
p. 101.
13 Jouanjouan describes the historical school as a programme 
of Savigny and Puchta. See: O. Jouanjouan, Une Histoire de la pen-
sée juridique…, op. cit., p. 48.
14 A. Dufour, Droits de l’homme…, op. cit., p. 162.
15 Otto Gierke, Die historische Rechtsschule und die Germanisten, 
Gustav-Schade, Berlin 1903.
16 B. Binoche and J-P. Cléro, Bentham contre les droit de l’homme, 
op. cit., p. 186.
17 Ibidem, p. 189.
18 Wolf Rosenbaum, Naturrecht und positives Recht, Hermann 
Luchterhand Verlag, Darmstadt 1972, p. 48.
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and see them as the reasons of the revolution.19 Today we 
can see some aspects of these arguments in the critics of the 
cultural relativist theory.
The historical law school tried to explain the source 
of rights with the notion Volksgeist (Spirit of a Nation).20 
Volksgeist is a notion used since Herder but has acquired 
a new dimension with the historical law school. Savigny 
said that law, like language, lives in the consciousness 
of a nation.21 Volksgeist is a concept which is interpreted 
in many different ways.22 Hugo used this notion for the 
Roman law. He tried to understand the Roman law in the 
spirit of his time and its transformation to his time.23 Sav-
igny interpreted the notion Volkgeist as an ideal notion for 
the nation and culture and understand it not like Thiba-
ut as the whole of the society.24 Hegel was also on the side 
of Thibaut in the codification-dispute and interpreted the 
Volksgeist25 different from Savigny. For Hegel the Volksgeist 
is something which is in a permanent change and not some-
thing fixed. Hegel thinks that the Volksgeist embodies this 
organicism and must be rational. He sees the Volksgeist 
in relation with the Weltgeist (World spirit). For Hegel 
Volksgeist depends on the counsciousness of the Nation 
and is something that must be constructed. So the notion is 
19 Leo Strauss, Droit Naturel et Histoire, Flammarion, Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1954, p. 25.
20 Raymond Aron defines historicity as a doctrine which proclaims 
the relativity of the values and philosophies and also of the histori-
cal notions. Leo Strauss stigmatizes this kind of historicism and his 
historicism of the historical law school. See: Christophe Bouton, Le 
procès de l’histoire. Fondements et postérité de l’idealisme historique 
de Hegel, Vrin, Paris 2004, p. 255.
21 Carl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtswissenschaft, 3rd Edition, Heidelberg 1840, p. 11.
22 Christoph Mährlein, Volksgeist und Recht: Hegel’s Philosophie 
der Einheit und ihre Bedeutung in der Rechtswissenschaft, König-
shausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2000.
23 Stephan Meder, Rechtsgeschichte, Böhlau Verlag, Köln 2005, 
p. 273.
24 R. Schröder, Rechtsgeschichte, op. cit., p 100.
25 For the Notion Volksgeit see: Hermann Kantorowics,“Volksgeist 
und die historische Rechtsschule”, Historische Zeitschrift, Bd. 108, 
No. 2 (1912), p. 231.
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not only related to the past like in Savigny’s organic view.26 
On the contrary to Savigny’s view for Hegel law can only 
be realised in the state, where law became objectivity but 
the Nation (Volk) is not yet a State.27 For Hegel only in the 
State the nation has the consciousness of its rights. It must 
be reminded that Hegel’s Volksgeist theory must be ana-
lysed with his Weltgeist theorie which is in relation with 
the notion of freedom.
2. Distinction of Hegel between Formal and Concrete Freedom
Hegel’s critique of the natural right theory differs from the 
historical law school and is based on his notion of freedom. 
Hegel’s critique is a get together from the organicism of the 
historical school and rationalism of the Enlightenment.28 
Hegel also criticises the natural law adopted by the Declara-
tion and says that would be better to rename the natural law 
as philosophical law because when we talk about nature we 
understand the unconscious nature.29 Natural law in Hegel’s 
theory, is not seen from the classical perspective, he says that 
it is a mistake to separate positive law from natural law.30 
He tries to relative the natural law.31 Natural Law and tra-
ditions must be evaluated together. So we see that Hegel as 
different from Savigny does not reject the natural law com-
pletely but tries to reconcile positive and natural law.
The French revolution is seen by Hegel as a step in the his-
torical evaluation of the notion of freedom. According to Hegel 
26 The opposition between Savigny and Hegel is also seen as the 
opposition between the “historical” and “philosophical” law school. 
See: O. Jouanjouan, Une Histoire de la pensée juridique…, op. cit., 
p. 57.
27 Oscar Daniel Brauer, Dialektik der Zeit, Untersuchung zu Hegel’s 
Metaphysik der Weltgeschichte, Fromann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstadt 1982, p. 48.
28 B. Binoche and J-P. Cléro, Bentham contre les droit de l’homme, 
op. cit., p. 191.
29 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1986, p. 35.
30 Ibidem.
31 Philippe Gérard, L’esprit des droits. Philosophie des droits de 
l’homme, Saint-Louis, Bruxelles 2007, p. 51.
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the French revolution asks but can’t resolve the question 
of political freedom.32 Also, taking natural law as the base 
of the declaration of human rights and the contractual the-
ory is criticized by him. As it can easily be concluded, Hegel 
criticised the abstraction of the rights along with the con-
tractual theory which is accepted as one of the pillars of the 
declaration. In this context, he criticised Rousseau’s notion 
of general will. Hegel says that “Rousseau reduces the union 
of people in the state of a contract and therefore to something 
based on their arbitrary wills, their opinion and their capri-
ciously given express consent”.33
The interrogation of the sense of liberty is one of the 
main aims of sustaining the legitimacy of human rights.34 
In this context Hegel’s differentiation between real/con-
crete and formal freedom is very important. Hegel makes 
a distinction between formal and concrete or real free-
dom. Real freedom can be realised in a learning process. 
In the Phenomenology of the Spirit Hegel shows that free-
dom is a process of self-consciousness. We can classi-
fy this process as following: 1. Individual consciousness, 
2. Cultural consciousness and 3. Absolute consciousness.35 
In the Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel attempts to pur-
sue the development of a consciousness that finally trans-
cendent its historical cultural conditions and relativity.
Hegel is not after a destructive form of individualism for 
the modern world certainly not of the sort that caused the 
French revolution.36 He is after an individualism that is com-
patible and can be synthesized with Sittlichkeit,37 a notion 
which is also translated as ethical life. Hegel says that individ-
uals are constructed by their social and cultural worlds. His 
goal is to get beyond the destructive form of individualism.38
32 Joachim Ritter, Hegel und die französische Revolution, Suhrkamp 
Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1965, p. 24.
33 T.M. Knox (Ed.), Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1967, p. 157.
34 P. Gérard, L’esprit des droits…, op. cit., p. 52.
35 Philip V. Klein, Hegel and the Other, State University of New 
York, New York 2005, p. 2.
36 Ibidem, p. 142.
37 Ibidem, p. 143.
38 Ibidem.
| 189| Critics of Human Rights from a Historical Perspective
For Hegel the French revolution is a step in the evolution of the 
freedom but couldn’t realise the concrete or real freedom.39
The master and slave or lord and bondsman relation is impor-
tant in this context. The slave becomes a dependent conscious-
ness but also the master is not the independent consciousness 
he thinks he is. He is dependent of the slave. Fear and work 
transfer the slave. But fear is also the beginning of wisdom. 
Kojève analyses the master-slave relation in a historical con-
text, antic Greek, Roman Empire, Christianity and French rev-
olution are steps for the realisation of freedom.40 Freedom must 
have four moments. First, it must be subjective, second it must 
be rational, third it must be concretized and fourth institution-
alized embedded in the world which we live.41 Hegel claims 
that each individual is the son of his nation at the specific stage 
in this nation’s development. No one can escape from the spir-
it of his nation. Following this view, all consciousness devel-
ops in a specific cultural context and specific historical era.
What does Hegel mean by concrete freedom? The concrete 
freedom is only possible in the state because state is for Hegel 
the actuality of concrete freedom. ‘Concrete freedom consists 
in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests 
not only achieve their complete development and gain explic-
it recognition for their right but, for one thing, they also pass 
over of their own accord into the interest of the universal’.42 
The formal subjective freedom43 of individuals consist in their
39 Hauke Brunkhorst, “Hegel und die Französische Revolution. 
Die Verzichtbarkeit der Restauration und die Unverzichtbarkeit 
der Revolution”, in: Die Ideen von 1789 in der deutschen Rezeption, 
Herausgegeben vom Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main 1989, p. 165.
40 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the reading of Hegel, Compiled 
by Raymond Queneau, Edited by Allan Bloom, Translated by James 
H. Nichols, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1980, p. 95; Alexandre 
Kojève, Hegel Felsefesine Giriş, Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul 
2001, pp. 71-73.
41 P. Klein, Hegel and the Other, op. cit., p. 227.
42 T. M. Knox (Ed.), Hegel’s philosophy of right, op. cit., p. 160.
43 This freedom is collectively manifested as “public opinion”. Public 
opinion deserves to be as much respected as despised for its concrete 
expression and for the concrete consciousness it express, respected for 
its essential basis (G. F. W. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Rechts, op. cit., p. 485).
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having and expressing their own private judgments, opin-
ions and recommendations. The concrete freedom is that the 
will has not only subjective aims but also general aims which 
include the well-being of the society.44 This kind of freedom 
is a superior form of liberty. So as a result, the real free-
dom is only possible in a process of the consciousness45 of the 
mind which is at the same time a learning process.
3. Human right as a culture and sentimental education
How to bloom concrete freedom in the society? Here we 
see the importance of the learning process. Hegel’s theory 
of freedom related with the level of consciousness is differen-
tiated but also used by the Frankfurt School. Taking Ador-
no’s negative dialectics and “Education after Auschwitz” 
as an example, today in Germany we come across ‘holo-
caust-education’. Trying to analyse the Holocaust and its 
sources, Adorno concludes that education is the main guar-
antee of that what happened in Germany never takes place 
again.46 The departure point of Adorno’s theory of Bildung 
is the common understanding of it as the subjective side 
of culture. ‘Culture’ means here the system of representa-
tions of what Hegel calls ‘objective spirit’, that is, of ideas, 
concepts, worldviews, in which the meanings of humanity 
in their historical development come into being.47
Adorno and Horkheimer draw from the assessment 
made by Hegel in the chapter on “Absolute Freedom and 
Terror” of the Phenomenology of Spirit, according to which 
there is a relationship between the ethics of utility of the 
Enlightenment and terror, which Hegel finds in the French 
44 Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophie der Wissenschaften III, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 288.
45 The constitution depends on the consciousness of the people 
and so the constitution can change depending on the consciousness 
of liberty; See: Ch. Bouton, Le procès de l’histoire…, op. cit., p. 286.
46 Theodor W. Adorno, Erziehung zur Mündigkeit, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 104.
47 Krassimir Stojanov, “Education as Social Critique: On Theodor 
Adorno’s Philosophy of Education”, in New College, Oxford, 2013 
http:// www.philosophy-of-eucation.org/uploads/2013%20Conference/
Papers/Stojanov.pdf, (accessed November 10,2013)
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Revolution.48 Adorno and Horkheimer do not explicitly extend 
their reflection on ethics to the field of human rights, a bridge 
between moral sentiments and rights is pursued of Rorty’s 
postmodern approach to moral progress. For Rorty the gen-
ocide of the European Jews plays a key role in his recontex-
tualisation of human rights, and he adopts the Holocaust as 
the inevitable horizon of understanding from which human 
rights need to be thought when he refers to our rights cul-
ture as the Post-holocaust human rights culture.49 Drawing 
on Hegel and Nietzsche, Rorty asserts the historical, contex-
tualist, or perspectivist character of knowledge, a knowledge 
that is not born out of the historical circumstances.50 ‘To the 
metaphysical theories of human rights Rorty opposes a his-
toricist perspective. In the field of the human it is not possi-
ble to speak about a human nature because the ambit of the 
human is precisely the sphere proper of culture. The human 
nature is cultural.’51
Rorty in his article “Human Rights, Rationality and 
Sentimentality”52, talks about a human rights culture.53 
Rorty says that historicist thinkers have denied that there 
is such a thing a ‘human nature.’54 Rorty recommends aban-
doning ‘human rights foundationalism.’55 He rejects any sort 
of Kantian identification with a transcultural and ahistorical 
48 José Manuel Barreto, “Ethics of Emotions as Ethics of Human 
Rights: A Jurisprudence of Sympathy in Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Rorty”, Law and Critique, Vol. 17, 2006, p. 78.
49 Ibid. P. 98.
50 Baretto writes: “The human condition is the result of the his-
torical dynamics in which human beings and societies act on them-
selves. In addition, as there are no phenomena outside the domain 
of history, there is no human or social nature but historical and cul-
tural configurations”, in: J.M. Barreto, “Ethics of Emotions…”, op. cit., 
pp. 99-103.
51 Ibidem, p. 101.
52 Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentali-
ty”, in The Politics of Human Rights, ed. Obrad Savić, Verso, London 
1999, p. 70.
53 This notion was first used by Eduard Rabossi in his article 
“Human Rights naturalised”.
54 R. Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality”, 
op. cit., p. 70.
55 Michael J. Perry, The Idea of human rights, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1998, p. 39.
192 | Birden Güngören Bulgan |
self and replaces it by a Hegelian identification with our 
own community understood as a cultural and historical prod-
uct.56 So maybe we must read the historical critics through 
a human rights culture which cannot be see apart from 
a human rights education.
Another important analyse comes from Karl-Otto Apel. 
Apel uses also Hegel’s arguments in his article and draws 
attention to the problem of the plurality of the good, which is 
also a very important point for the cultural relativists because 
they say that the good for one society may not be good for the 
other. To solve the problem the tolerance is the key in a mul-
ticultural society.57 Apel makes a distinction between negative 
tolerance which is based on indifference and positive or affirm-
ative tolerance based on appreciation of the deep and mani-
fold values-traditions and resources that can enrich human 
culture in general and social engagements of individuals.58
Affirmative tolerance can be related to Hegel’s theory 
of recognition. Also Taylor refers to multiculturalism with 
the argument of Hegel’s recognition.59 The hegemony of one 
culture brings problems after Taylor, so we can see the prob-
lematic of multiculturalism with surmount the problematic 
with the arguments of recognition and tolerance. It is this 
difficulty that Axel Honneth, a Habermasian commentator 
of Hegel, tries to correct in his major work, The Struggle for 
Recognition. Honneth argues that ‘the struggle for recogni-
tion is the key ethical relationship or the main form of prac-
tical intersubjectivity in the Hegelian system.’60 To redress 
this problem, Honneth supplements Hegel by introduc-
ing a third type of recognition, which he calls solidarity.61 
56 P.V. Klein, Hegel and the Other, op. cit., p. 237.
57 Karl-Otto Apel, “Plurality of the Good? The Problem of Affirm-
ative Tolerance in a multicultural Society from an Ethical Point 
of View”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 10, Is. 2, 2002 (199-213).
58 Ibidem, p. 200.
59 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalisme, Différence et démocratie, 
Aubier, Paris 1994, pp. 43;54; 62;70.
60 Costas Douzinas, “Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can 
Hegel Teach Us About Human Rights?”, Journal of Law and Socie-
ty, Vol. 29 (2002), No. 3, p 394.
61 Axel Honneth, La lutte pour la reconnaissance, Cerf, Paris 2002, 
p. 113.
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Honneth says that Hegel’s solidarity has its source in the 
historical process of the Revolution but he tries to develop 
the ‘fraternity’ of the French revolution into a intersubjec-
tive notion of ‘solidarity’.62 A personality based on solidarity 
has all the elements of legal recognition but, it additionally 
enjoys social esteem, the recognition of its particular charac-
teristics and qualities developed within its group and com-
munity.63 Honneth says that the first recognition is about 
law but the second recognition of values.64 Honneths argu-
ments for recognition are also important for human rights. 
Because the human rights must be recognised by law but 
they also have a value in solidarity.
4. Human Rights as a Learning Process
Today we can find a similar debate about rights which has 
his sources in the debates after the French revolution. Today 
cultural relativists want to reject rights because they are 
not compatible with their own culture. This main problem 
in the debate of the cultural relativist can be derived from 
Herders enlightment philosophy and the Volksgeist theory.65 
So we can see some arguments of the cultural relativist theo-
ries in the historical law school theory. The historical school 
has relativized rights which are innate. The cultural rela-
tivist theories take over this relativisation of natural rights 
62 Axel Honneth, “Atomisierung und Sittlichkeit. Zu Hegels Kri-
tik der Französischen Revolution”, in: Die Ideen von 1789, op. cit., 
p. 182.
63 According to Douzinas “This intricate but paradoxical inter-
twinnig of identity, desire, and human rights is Hegel’s lesson for 
postmodern jurisprudence”, in: C. Douzinas, “Identity, Recognition…”, 
op. cit., p. 395.
64 A. Honneth, La lutte pour la reconnaissance, op. cit., p. 136.
65 “Moral relativism, the normative base of cultural relativism 
(…) the protogorean thesis in terms of community as the measure 
of all things (…) had a foothold in philosophical thought until the 
eighteenth century when J.G. Herder dissented from Enlightenment 
philosophy claims that all nations had a unique way of being only 
regional and contingent principles existed. Condemning universal val-
ues he introduced the concept of Volksgeist, the spirit of the nation”, 
in: Jerome J. Shestack, “The Philosophic Foundations of Human 
Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1998, p. 229.
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as universal rights. But also the approaches of cultural rel-
ativists differ. For example Donnelly defends a ‘relative and 
tempered’ universalism66 and shows the defects of a strong 
cultural relativism.67
Hegel is also a philosopher who is by some interpreters 
seen as a cultural relativist.68 But the interpretation of the 
Volksgeist theory as something which is in a permanent 
change and the relation between the Volksgeist and Welt-
geist (World Spirit) show that we can’t count Hegel in the cul-
tural relativist theories. Hegel’s concept of freedom leads us 
to another discussion. Real freedom is only possible in a learn-
ing process and is in relation with the consciousness. This 
consciousness is not only subjective but must become an objec-
tive consciousness of the society. Real freedom as something 
learned and not imposed can be a key for the human rights 
education. The critique of Hegel is that the formal freedom is 
a step of the French Revolution but not enough can be applied 
to human rights. Human rights can only trough an internali-
sation of the rights with a learning process be realised.
We can find some of Hegel’s arguments developed in the 
theses of Horkheimer and Adorno in relation with educa-
tion but Rorty tries to develop these theses to a human right 
theory: sentimental education. So we see the importance that 
66 Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007 (281-306).
67 Donnelly, in his book Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice makes an analyse of cultural relativism, and says that the cul-
tural relativism is understood as either strong cultural relativism or 
weak cultural relativism. The strong cultural relativism tries to takes 
culture as the source of legitimacy of one rule. On the other hand, 
weak cultural relativism takes cultural argument seriously but tries 
to surmount to the excess of universality. Donnelly tries to show the 
weakness of the radical cultural relativist argument and says that 
morally to defend this strong cultural relativism has its defects. Don-
nelly tries to show the weakness of the radical cultural relativist argu-
ment and says that morally to defend this strong cultural relativism 
has its defects. He claims that we mustn’t place culture against human 
rights. We must also see the abuses made in the name of human rights. 
Donnelly is for the relativity of the universal rights and his function-
al effectiveness. See: Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in The-
ory and Practice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2013, p. 120).
68 Kain sees Hegel as a serious cultural relativist, see: P.V. Klein, 
Hegel and the Other, op. cit., p. 234).
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not only the education of human rights is important but also 
how to internalise this education and here the sentimental 
education can play another key role.
Culture must be understood in this context as something 
not imposed but something learned. Apel sees the problems 
when one culture is imposed and sees the solution in the posi-
tive tolerance. So in a multicultural society we cannot impose 
one culture, like cultural relativists try to resolve the prob-
lem. But from another perspective, cultural relativists are 
right, because human rights as something imposed has also 
no future. The “theory of recognition” developed with Taylor 
and Honneth’s theses becomes more important because the 
dialogue and the positive tolerance can be a key in resolve 
some problems. Human rights become a culture but also 
a method of intervention in other countries. So like Hegel 
differentiates formal and real freedoms, we must differen-
tiate between formal and real human rights. Human rights 
are abused by a hegemonic language.69 Only through a learn-
ing process70 and the consciousness of the society the human 
rights can be internalised and exercise.
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